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ne of the central tenets of the long-range, deep ecology movement is 
aluing the intrinsic rights of organisms. Although this is a credo for 
any of us, a commitment to all life processes irrespective of human 
valuing, antagonists to the “intrinsic rights” argument, several of them 
ommitted environmentalists themselves, shy away from its stronger 
thics. The thesis presented here is based on a biosemiotic assumption 
hat natural systems are intrinsically evaluative from within precisely 
ecause signification occurs at all levels. If this is the case, human 
valuative practices do not have a forgone evaluative supremacy over 
ognitive and utilitarian evaluative processes displayed by many, if not 
ll, non-human animals. The stronger biosemiotic argument asserts that 
ecause meaning and signification are widespread in the natural world, 
ll creatures are relative evaluators with respect to their umwelten and 
ach other. Thus to have an intrinsic value is to function in an 
ntermediated, interrelated whole. This biosemiotic approach then 
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asserts that no single creature can fully evaluate for another or for the 
whole, or if it does, it must conclude that everything has an “intrinsic 
right” to evaluate. When understood, this position obligates and 
amplifies the initial “intrinsic right” argument in a paradoxical but still 
deep ecological way.1  
 
Because no animal ever plays the role of an observer, one may assert that they 
never enter into relationships with neutral objects. – Jacob Von Uexküll2
 
Introduction: Uexküll’s Functional Circles  
  
Present-day biosemioticians recognize in Jacob Von Uexküll3 the 
ecologist/ethologist who could transcend the biology of his day to 
capture the evaluative biosemiotic quote that starts off this writing and 
the thoughts that follow:  
Only when we recognize that everything in nature is created by its meaning, and 
that all Umwelts are but voices that take part in a universal score, will the way be 
open to lead us out of the narrow confines of our own Umwelt. 
 
That his insight has been slow to trickle into psychology, as 
ecopsychology, or into ecology and the deep ecology movement is a 
mystery of philosophy of science or a historical matter. His biosemiotic 
ideas are paraphrased and expanded here to assert the following: 
 
1. Natural systems are intrinsically evaluative from within and 
throughout precisely because signification occurs at all levels.  
2. No being is exempt from evaluation and itself values or 
evaluates (is in turn valued and evaluated) for maximizing its 
survival odds and well being. 
3. To the extent that several beings value or evaluate their inner 
and outer environments or each other, they enter into ecological 
relationships best described as function circles. 
4. The integrative value of the WHOLE with respect to diversity 
and additive effects of evaluative beings, makes the whole (a 
function circle) the intrinsic unit to which VALUE can be given. 
5. Because WHOLES cannot be broken without leading to 
diseased umwelten, the individual contributions toward 
integration possess intrinsic values. 
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6. There is no neutral value to anything.  
 
From his beginning quote and insight, “Because no animal ever plays 
the role of an observer, one may assert that they never enter into 
relationships with neutral objects,” I will emphasize the obvious: every 
ecological transaction has meaning, everything is imparting or deducing 
meaning, and therefore, everything has more than intrinsic value-- 
Intrinsic rights can then be assigned and follow from an intrinsic value 
position. They are all equal interpretants and no interpretation can be 
said to be inclusive of the whole or exclusive of the others. 
Paradoxically, even humans cannot confer the designation intrinsic 
right unless it is a basic and irrefutable observation of their relative, and 
only relative, role as interpretants of nature. The claim of something 
(everything) having intrinsic value, even when used as a shorthand 
phrase to describe its awesome relative role in the whole, minimizes in 
my mind the active interpretative role of every thing, capable in its own 
right, to make judgments about human actions. It is a trialectics: we are 
being Evalued as well.4
 
Finally, it is difficult to ignore much of present-day natural history and 
ecology and conclude that systemic, functional wholes do not exist, or 
that these wholes are not supported by the functional and existential 
diversity of many individual organisms, or that their existential doings 
are unrelated to each other, or that any one thing in the whole is less 
than any one other thing. Biosemiotics includes the central notion that 
all these existential doings range from the internally communicative 
(endosemiotic—hormonal interactions) to the externally 
communicative.5  
 
Meaning is at the core of everything nature does because one would 
presume that messaging implies, at the very least, an intention or an 
object, a sign, and an interpreter of that sign. A biosemiotic description 
of LIFE would include the maxim that meaning precedes intelligence, 
intelligent function, or that IT supports intelligent processes. The 
preceding is a more fundamental distinction than predicating LIFE on 
pervasive, widespread intelligence. By keeping this distinction in mind, 
one is protected somewhat from assuming ipso facto Anthropic 
Principles or Intelligent Teleologies that may distract us from thinking 
about or partaking of natural process as they are or have existed, 
irrespective of human fancy or fantasy. Equally, unfortunately for all of 
us, some psychologists have misappropriated or abused the term 
“intelligence” and robbed it of its more bisoemiotic meaning substrate 
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for most of the twentieth century. Intelligence, word and idea, has a bad 
reputation; a tainted eugenic genesis.  
 
Valuing Versus Evaluating 
 
In order to use a common ecological and functional frame of reference, 
I will refer to most basic sensorial, perceptual, and cognitive processes 
as evaluation or evaluating. On the other hand, I will refer to the self-
conscious aspects of evaluation or evaluating as valuing. In doing this, I 
do not mean to imply that evaluation or evaluating is less than valuing, 
only that valuing is its self-conscious aspect. Humans and many other 
non-human animals do both, evaluate and valuate. The term 
Evaluation, capitalized, includes both evaluating and valuing. 
Moreover, Evaluation is assumed to be a biosemiosis where signs are 
interpreted in either unconscious or self-conscious ways. 
 
The following are examples of evaluation to the extent that we assume 
no self-conscious effort is taking place in the minds of all involved:  
 
1. A bird considers the strength of an opponent and decides not to 
contest a given territory. 
2. An amoeba discerns that a certain noxious chemical is present 
and moves away from its concentration in a tropic fashion. 
3. A human artist unconsciously decides that black crows are 
needed in order to “balance” a yellow field of painted 
sunflowers. 
4. A bear judges a certain leaping salmon to be more nutritious 
than another and plunges into the frigid waters after it. 
5. A bear decides that a certain human hiker is more nutritious than 
blackberries. 
 
The following are examples of valuation to the extent that we assume 
self-conscious effort is taking place in the minds of all involved:  
 
1. A chimpanzee looks into a mirror, finds a morsel of food lodged 
between his teeth and decides to pick it away because that 
makes him look more handsome. 
2. A human miner decides, after some thought, that it is to his 
financial self-interest to bulldoze a certain hill, irrespective of 
the effects of his actions. 
Volume 22, Number 1 29
3. A wolf is self-conscious of his newly acquired alpha status and 
produces the expected dominant posturing to broadcast his 
position. 
4. A big bird arranges his feathers and positions himself 
advantageously in order to maximize the glittery effects of 
reflected light on his multicolored plumes. 
5. A mouse or a louse generates an image of himself that 
distinguishes him from any other mouse or louse. 
 
What matters to other arguments made later is not that evaluation is 
different from valuation but that both confer a relative status to any 
creature, allowing it to make judgments about their situational action 
fields or their permanent umwelten, and that the rest of the inhabitants 
of the whole can evaluate as often and as capably as humans do. Last, 
two general aspects of Evaluation can be noted: social evaluative 
cognition and utilitarian evaluative choices.6 Social evaluative 
cognition may lead to valuation to the extent that sophisticated social 
hierarchies are in place and individuals must keep track of their often 
shifty social status. George Herbert Mead made the case that these 
intense social situations can lead to the cognitive generation of The 
Generalized Other, or in today’s terminology, the basis for a theory of 
mind. Utilitarian evaluative choices need not be related to socialness or 
to social standing, and are more universal or basic existential judgments 
pertaining to the general welfare of the individual creature. Again, both 
humans and non-human animals do both. 
 
According to Sessions and Naess’s eight-point, deep ecology platform, 
for example (point one): 
 
The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has inherent value. The 
value of non-human forms is independent of the usefulness of the non-human 
world for human purposes.  
 
If an Uexküllian biosemiotic synthesis is possible with deep ecology 
movement principles and Ecopsychology, then neither humans nor non-
human animals, if they are able, can help but to make all sorts of value 
judgments (aesthetic, spiritual, scientific, or utilitarian-commercial) 
about one another. In a biosemiotic sense, “The value of non-human 
forms” cannot be said to be “independent of the usefulness of the non-
human world for human purposes.” There is perhaps a deeper way to 
interpret this relationship. Paradoxically, this new interpretation may be 
a true synthesis of Uexküllian biosemiotic, Deep Ecology, and 
Ecopsychology. The successful synthesis hinges in Uexküll’s 
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biosemiotic and ecological insight pertaining function circles. Function 
circles are integrated wholes where intelligences flourish in the context 
of a whole. Thus, Evaluation cannot be prevented, but only corrected 
and shaped toward an original or biosemiotic genesis.  
 
Only Humans Evaluate? 
 
In environmental ethics, the jury still seems to be out regarding the deep 
ecology movement’s tenet that natural things, beings, and so on, have 
“inherent value,” “independent value,” or “intrinsic worth.”7 To some 
philosophers of environmental ethics, this is a Buddhist fantasy or an 
ecological ideal that becomes impractical when applied to human 
“needs” to extract from Nature whatever we need to pursue our 
realizations.  
 
Some of these philosophers8 argue that only human beings can evaluate 
their reality, thus all natural objects have a value relative to a human 
need, from aesthetic to profit-based. This is a “good argument” to the 
extent that (a) other creatures do not evaluate or valuate; (b) self-
conscious evaluation is of a higher moral order than unconscious 
evaluation; (c) only humans using language can describe the value of 
things, to each other, and make comparisons about the relative worth, 
significance, and reality of any values at all; or (d) humans are endowed 
with special extra-natural properties and ensuing rights that confer their 
Evaluating with a supervisory role over all other organisms.  
 
These are “good” arguments to the extent that these philosophers 
assume that wolves, for example, have no value systems of their own, 
have no aesthetic sense, or are incapable of hierarchical or classificatory 
cognition. But because wolves in fact do live in highly regulated and 
hierarchical packs, even the staunchly anthropocentric philosopher must 
admit that wolves have social evaluative cognition, otherwise there 
would be no need to describe readily observable behaviour in terms of 
an alpha or omega “something.” Social evaluative cognition has been 
studied and reported in many animals. But even at a more basic 
evaluative level, animals, such as the South American macaw, have 
been observed making utilitarian evaluative choices. (Wolves and 
many other animals do as well: the choice of a place to sleep in the cold 
at night, for example.)  
 
If empirical research is of any use to philosophers, the questions get 
more complicated for them: does a wolf with a readily observable sense 
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of social hierarchy even have intrinsic rights to have, or to express, this 
social sense of hierarchy? Are these rights the same or different than the 
human rights to do the same or something similar? If a wolf decides to 
fight for an Alpha role, how does he do that? Is this some kind of lowly 
instinctual behaviour that has nothing to do with having evaluated first 
his social status and the entire panorama of his social pack structure?  
 
If we twist their arms enough and philosophers admit that intelligent 
and social animals have more intrinsic rights than, say, a rock, they 
have lost their sagacious argument already, because the rock and its 
minerals feed the plants that feed deer that the wolf hunts in an 
interrelated ecological pattern and whole. Remove the rock, the water, 
the lowly plants, the forest, and what do we end up with? Nothing to 
evaluate or to philosophize about! Now here comes our important 
counterargument: the value has never been on any single thing but in 
the ensemble, on the ecological pattern and the ensemble that evaluates 
from within and throughout. That is the wisdom of ecology and that 
was the wisdom of humans who bothered to understand it.  
 
It is perhaps a decontextualized question, when thinking in ecological 
totalities, to ask whether wolves, plants or rocks have intrinsic rights in 
and of themselves? I think they do, in and of themselves, but that is my 
own deep ecological intuition. Some deep ecology supporters, arguing 
from Buddhist insights, are not really saying that a single rock has an 
absolute, unrelated intrinsic value, but rather that everything has value 
because everything has interrelated Buddha nature. If one does not like 
the Buddha nature clause, then one could rephrase this claim in 
ecological whole terms as saying that everything contributes to a 
majestic pattern of life, together. To the extent that deep ecology 
principles are not interpreted from a Buddhist perspective, Arne Naess, 
for example, argues that its many manifestations are principled in a 
reverence for LIFE.9
 
The other important element of this discussion hinges on the relative 
evaluative role that each evaluative being has on the WHOLE. Should 
we give more weight to humans evaluating their umwelten than to 
wolves and foxes? If so, why? By what fair rule do we make the human 
a hierarchical superior evaluative being? If nothing else, greater 
consciousness and self-awareness pins that mind to a tighter 
commitment to the rule: “I, out of all evaluative beings, shall not, 
cannot evaluate above them, for my own selfish wants, because I should 
know better.” And the reason for this is rather simple: a being with 
greater consciousness and self-awareness is in a position of advantage 
to begin to understand ecological interrelatedness as a pervasive 
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existential principle and is thus also obligated to honour it. That 
understanding should continue into an extended morality of natural 
inclusiveness that clearly grasps and acts from the principle stated 
above: everything contributes to a majestic pattern of life, together.  
 
In general, valuative self-conscious processes, including human 
semiosis, are not superior to generic for-survival evaluative ones for the 
simple reason that the former can easily lead (and do often) into self-
deluding, incorrect, bad text. The word “text” is used in both semiotic 
and biosemiotic senses. That is, “text” not merely as a human-generated 
graphic and linear representation of language, but as an all-
encompassing communicative exchanges as described by Jacques 
Derrida.10 For biosemioticians, “text” includes all communicative 
processes: molecular transactions, broadcasted signals, tracks, bird 
songs, or cows mooing.11 All the preceding communicative processes 
are assumed to be in either pre-evaluative-human and original natural 
contexts or affected by, and transformed from their original meaning, 
semioses into new synthetic and possibly false interpretations. These 
humanly transformed synthetic interpretations are either erosive of 
original “text” transactions or edifying to the extent that they reiterate 
their meaning of original natural affiliation. To sum up, in semiotics 
and biosemiotics (and their extended disciplines in ecopsychology), the 
usage of the term “text” means not solely its graphic or artifactual 
expression, but also includes real physical organic processes and the 
complex levels of meaning interactions discovered in ecology. 
Particularly for biosemioticians, the written human word is thus an 
impoverished and anorexic sign standing for real psychobiological or 
psycholinguistic processes that once were in sustainable harmonies with 
a natural world. Ecopscyhologically speaking, then, the extrication of 
the human body-mind-spirit system from that original biosemiotic 
context produces “bad text” and possibly illness.  
 
Thus the phrase “bad text” assumes a false or nature decontextualized 
text that affects cognition/consciousness leading to falsches 
Bewusstsein, “false consciousness,” and acts.12 This distinction is 
crucial to understanding ecopsychological issues of nature 
estrangement, or alienation to the extent that a “natural text” and 
original communication, rooted in ancient and sustainable human-
nature communicative exchanges, is in decline. Whether in oral or 
written communication, if “text” is a reflection of a purely synthetic and 
decontextualized manner of associating with Nature, or whether it is 
symptomatic of nature estrangement or alienation, then they are both 
“bad text.” 
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Furthermore, some supporters of deep ecology principles make a strong 
non-anthropocentric argument in this respect with their Buddhist 
distrust of linguistic processes, as language can be a hinderance to 
ecological insight. Zazen meditation, for example, becomes the active 
practice of text deconstruction. Zazen meditation is radical text 
deconstruction to the extent that thought-words are paid attention to in a 
focused manner, some of these thought-words can be discovered to be 
part of false speech or consciousness, or thought-words are themselves 
an impediment to word-less intuitions and meanings—messages from 
an ecological unconscious.13
 
Without this ongoing text deconstruction or some similar telluric 
correcting mechanism, bad text leads to bad consciousness and illness. 
This point will be expanded in the section dealing with ecopsychology. 
 
Ecopsychological Wellness: What Happens When We Evaluate 
Incorrectly? 
 
The intrinsic right, worth, value argument, particularly, runs the risk of 
being misappropriated or misunderstood during valuative self-
conscious processes by a malicious ape.14 Practically speaking, it could 
backfire into ecopsychological estrangement or alienation when the 
original telluric connection to pre-historical biosemiotic existential 
doings, does not exist or no longer has the lead role in whole 
communicative processes. (By original telluric connection is meant the 
original biosemiotic Earth-grounded text that more credibly described 
ecological and ontological realities.) For example, the talkative ape can 
be deluded into thinking that wants are needs or that its wants have an 
intrinsic right to be pursued by any means. (This is a respectful pun-
variant of Naess’s observation: “the difference between a means to the 
satisfaction of the need and the need must be considered.”)15
 
Given our present environmental and ecopsychological crises, it can be 
argued that Western philosophy and psychology have not been explicit 
enough about the morality, the relative role, that human actions have 
within the whole of Nature. Otherwise these crises would not be or 
there would be more debate. This is a personal opinion. The results of 
this moral ambiguity has been, with some notable exceptions, that much 
of humanity has been quite content to be in close proximity, 
association, and collusion with civilized centres as part of many 
anthropocentric and hyper-humanistic communal experiments. These 
experiments consistently reduced Nature to shreds. It is seldom the case 
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that anthropocentric or hyper-humanistic philosophers, psychologists, 
or our combined lifestyles are thought to be of blame. Denial or the 
deflection of responsibility seems to be the norm. Otherwise these 
crises would not be.  
 
So self-convincing and propagandistic is human text that it converts 
gatos (cats) into liebres (hares).16 Also, the “talking ape” can be 
deluded to the extent that it believes that because it uses language and 
other creatures seem not to, it has a default primacy over them. That it 
can or must speak for them, much like the patronizing of a person who 
speaks with an accent or is speech impaired (e.g., speaks for all animals 
and plants—an artificial semiosis that wants to speak for everything). A 
biosemiotic approach to this problem and arrogance does not cure every 
ill, but it does point to the fact that all beings have equal standing as 
evaluative and valuative trialectic agents, and that human language is 
neither more nor less worthy than all these other interpretative 
transactions.  
  
My perception of this self-delusion runs something like this: because I 
use language, and I have the intrinsic right to use it as a species that 
has it, I can broadcast more openly anything that comes to mind. 
Therefore, these things that come to mind have an intrinsic right onto 
themselves, by association. If the wolf has an intrinsic right to howl, 
why can’t I “howl” with empty text?  
 
And thus, environmental, ecological, and ecopsychological problems 
are created by dissociated text, cognition, and by estranged or alienated 
psychologies. The problem is grave indeed. Unfortunately, because 
most people do not have the advantage of meta-linguistic or self-
critiquing education, their self-delusion is easily manipulated by 
others.17  
 
Language that dissociates natural mentality from its telluric origins and 
takes itself, synthetically, into an imploded artificial semiosis, is the 
beginning of mental illness. Erich Fromm recognized this process as 
abstractification and I have given it a more semiotically relevant name: 
singularization.18 I have also employed this analogy to illustrate the 
problem: 
 
semiosis – psychology —— biosemiosis – ecopsychology 
 
This shorthand analogy appears in many guises in other work and 
distinguishes, I believe, my ecopsycological and biosemiotic 
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perspectives from those of others.19 This analogy says that on the left 
side belong synthetic and corruptible text and on its right our more 
ancient telluric origins and original text. In other work, I have admitted 
this analogy is imperfect in that its biosemiotic and ecopsychological 
side also implies a higher experiential level20 of becoming: 
transpersonalization into NATURE. 
By associating the words biosemiotics with ecopsychology, there is an 
implication that civilized culture produces semiosis and cannot be 
called ecological or ecopsychological (as K. Lewin, U. Broffenbrenner, 
and A. Lang do). To the extent that civilized culture is significantly 
estranged or even alienated from raw nature and its processes, it 
cannot be called ecological or ecopsychological. (It should not!) This 
careless labeling deceives in implying that humans, immersed in the 
civilized milieu, still have the capacity to interpret natural or biological 
signs21 and thus enter into a proto-human biosemiosis with pristine 
surroundings. It is only the human at the fringes of civilized culture, or 
the one who is fully immersed in raw nature, the one who MUST 
understand the natural sign, that has an ecopsychology in this sense.  
Once this relationship and analogy are understood, both the 
biosemiotician and the ecopsychologist can shake hands and recognize 
that they are doing the same work. On the other hand, the human at the 
fringes of civilized culture, or the one who is fully immersed in raw 
nature, need not hear from me about their fundamental intimation. 
Elsewhere, I have written about the semiotic process I call 
singularization and described it as funneled-semiosis. More 
specifically:  
 
. . . singularization implies a . . . narrowing down, or impoverishment of meaning 
because the object [natural] being designated no longer exists, or, more 
importantly, has lost its original telluric connection, and because the semiotic triad 
does not function in its original context [in pristine, natural conditions]. By losing 
its telluric connection I mean that its original denotative and connotative function 
as part of a hunter-forager and early sustenance agricultural ethos, or, its 
hypological and intra-psychic function22 is no longer available to conscious mind. 
 
To the extent that we can deconstruct bad text, to the extent that we can 
rebuild the ancient telluric text, to the extent that this ancient text leads 
back toward healthy behaviours, and to the extent that this text and 
these behaviours are, once again, in harmony with ancient natural 
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patterns, then the way to ecopsychological wellness is, if not insured, at 
least on the path to mending. This is, in a nutshell, by incantation, 
conjuring, meditation, cajoling, embracing, or song, what an 
ecopsychologist attempts to do. 
Finally, it could be said that at the most fundamental level of 
ecopsychological work, assuming ecopsychological unconscious 
vitality and vital need or even a nascent awareness phrased in the 
realization that “I am better, whole, in the wild,” is the deconstruction 
of civilized tinsel text, false text, that stands in the way of a 
reconfiguration of consciousness itself.  
Such reconfiguration requires a radical and ongoing discipline of 
undoing civilized tinsel text, false text, while at the same time an 
authentic immersion in the wild. The immersion into the wild, in 
addition to presupposing being invested in an authentic path toward 
individuation,23 produces a new biosemiosis, and in a self-correcting 
way, forbids tinsel texting from remarking on the awesome. No one can 
underestimate the power of semiotic and biosemiotic processes, nor 
imagine that their transformation occurs at the surface of texting. In the 
manner of a koan we could say that: the head does not think the text, 
the text thinks the head, but Nature thinks the TEXT. Ecopsychological 
wellness means rethinking the text with Nature. 
Conclusion 
 
Karl Marx said that “language comes into being, like consciousness, 
from the basic need, from the scantiest intercourse with other 
humans.”24 Marx was not an ecologist, thus he could not extend his 
insight to an original and pristine mind in close trialectical exchanges 
with raw nature or derive from this insight a more encompassing 
philosophy leading to ecopsychology. Otherwise, Marx fails us, more 
often than not, like any other thinker who describes human activity 
anthropocentrically. Authentic language that signifies meaningfully and 
profoundly has its origins in direct experiences and, ideally, in 
experiences chosen by the individual to enhance LIFE and human 
development. To update Marx,25 if we can be so presumptuous, we 
must say that “Language comes into being,” or at least it did in the 
beginning, “. . . like consciousness, from the basic need,” of a full-
fledged immersion in a grander natural universe that included entire 
ecosystems and their mythical description when language, 
authentically, described an ecologically valid reality. 
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Both capitalist and socialist philosophies often disappoint us by ending 
with a bottom line that excludes the whole planet and with descriptions 
of language that arrive at the humanistic phrase “the needs and the 
wants of a human.” If their conclusions about human prosperity lay in 
an exclusion of grander natural processes, in an assumption that 
humanity sits in a parapet above these processes ready to yield 
utilitarian bottom lines, both ideologies leave humanity’s spirit thirsty 
and a planet in ruins. 
 
To reiterate our biosemiotic thesis, urban life and civilization that aims 
at subjugating Nature, produces “bad text,” semiotically defined, which 
is: chaotic, fragmented, propagandistic, technically alien, created and 
served by others, and extant from a genuine dialectics of manual 
dexterity disciplined by patience, apprenticeship, or true craftsmanship 
in the service of LIFE. To the extent that pristine nature, behaviour, 
cognition, and language not only inform one another but are shaped to 
their mature and life-fulfilling forms by a cultural context, then an 
artificial and fragmented life leads to an artificial being who is fragile in 
his psychology and oblivious to life’s fundamental realities.  
 
It is a much more complicated and dire problem than when Marx and 
Engels singled out Estranged Labour or the alienation of labour.26 My 
previous paragraph describes an extended and perpetual being condition 
where the labourer can never escape his sub-existence, even when he is 
removed from the inhuman conditions of repetitive and meaningless 
labour. The entire horizon of the labourer’s existence is dominated by 
false consciousness created by false text (propaganda), false 
institutions, false meanings, false ideologies, and a host of materialistic 
narcotics. The labourer as a hypercivilized citizen of most 
industrialized nations is also provided with a false sense of 
empowerment, an earned and disposable income (and credit as a new 
form of usury), that allows him or her to continue on with his or her 
slumber from one purchase to another, from one toy to the next.27 This 
restricted sense of freedom, consumer freedom, cannot be 
underestimated by the ecopsychologist because the practice taps into 
earlier juvenile wish-fulfillment trends assisting a pernicious regression. 
 
I would argue that the human animal, regardless of the fact that he 
could make “his life activity an object of his will and consciousness,” is 
equally “immediately one with its life activity”28 in the same manner 
and to the same degree that other animals experience this intimacy. If 
this intimacy were not possible or frequent it would not be reflected so 
strongly in naturalism, animism, Taoism, Shinto, or even Zen 
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Buddhism. If this intimacy did not exist, we could not explain the 
common feeling of connection obtained while in nature, or after having 
switched to activities that increase the awareness of new body routines, 
the feeling that the person is “one with the task,” or better, “one with 
the task of living.” 
 
The above implies that an ecopsychology that is grounded in deep 
ecology movement principles and in biosemiotics suspects that 
ecopsychological wellness depends on the deconstruction of bad, 
artificial text. But bad, artificial text, and the ultra-comfortable and 
pampered situations that it has led to, is deeply ingrained in Western 
industrialized nations and ethos. Many generations of civilized 
urbanites having been born outside of nature’s cycles or restraints (and 
having developed and been affected by political or corporate 
propaganda, nationalism, or unsustainable growth) have created a 
mindless purchasing mass that refuses to admit that something is 
wrong. Consequently, they will not take responsibility for their thoughts 
and actions. Consequently, the planet is going to pieces. 
 
For ecopsychological wellness it is perhaps more important to ask: 
What are my ecological intrinsic duties? rather than: What are my 
rights? If all organisms have duties to the whole, then abiding by these 
leads the way to health; organismic well-being is usually achieved 
within natural-ideal parameters. I have argued elsewhere, with 
countless others, that better than ecopsychological therapy, better than 
trying to teach an unapely ape that it conforms to natural habits, would 
be to address the youngest. This is Paul Shepard’s (and many other 
educators’) ontogenic salvation and formula.29 I have concluded with 
him, “that the lion’s share of ecopsychological work to be done is more 
educational more than therapeutic.”  
 
Imposing ecopsychological mental hygiene with political will and 
determination is another option. Short of a benign dictator legislating an 
ecopscyhological wellness plan for an entire nation, these policies could 
be achieved through the democratic process.30 But, when the Al Gores 
of the world are not elected by the reflexive purchasing mass that 
wishes to continue their ultra-comfortable and pampered ways, we can 
take it as a sign that things have turned for the worse. 
History has found itself at this crossroads before. The decay of glittery 
and false civilization, via ecopsychological estrangement or alienation, 
is followed by its demise, and in the chaos that ensues in its aftermath, 
only the natural religions, the ecopsychologically nimble, or the 
cynegetically able groups and individuals survive. An ecopsychologist, 
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by choice of profession and having a compassionate heart, has no other 
recourse. While waiting for chaos and for reconstruction, she has to 
heal in the present. She has to teach the cynegetic generations that will 
lead the way in the aftermath of chaos.  
Her message in the future will be identical to the ecopsychologically 
enduring messages of our distant past or better present: we are a hive, 
the hive is this planet, and whether queen, drone or worker, the hive, 
the whole, comes first. To live like this demands courage and fortitude, 
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